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CHAPTER4 /THEAMERICAN BABY
BOOM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
This chapter focuses on the recent baby boom, particularly on the
extent to which this represents an abrupt break with past experience.
The next chapter extends the analysis to the current fertility decline.
We first take a fresh look at the historical record in the light of
the Kuznets-cycle conception of economic change, taking care to
discuss separately the experience of three population groups with
significantly different patterns—foreign-born, native-born urban, and
native-born rural. After a brief retracing of several earlier findings,
the analysis quickly moves onto new ground, exploring some possible
reasons for the pattern observed.
The analysis is confined to the white population because of the
greater reliability of the data for this group and its predominant
influence in determining the pattern for the total.
KUZNETS CYCLES IN U.S. POPULATION
GROWTH AND FERTILITY
The Rate of Total Increase
We start with the rate of population growth. Since we are
interested in focusing on major movements, we employ five-year
averages of the basic data,' a choice governed partly by preference—
to eliminate or at least reduce the shorter-term changes associated
with the ordinary business cycle—and partly by necessity—because of
the initial mold in which some of the basic data are cast, particularly
those relating to fertility.
NOTE: An earlier version of this chapter was published in December 1981 in the
American Economic Review, and was reprinted by the National Bureau as its
Occasional Paper 79.
'For the rate of total increase, the average is implicit. The rate, which Is
actually calculated from observations on the population stock separated by five
years, yields a time pattern equivalent to that of a geometric average of the annual
rates of change within the successive quinquennia.
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Figure 22 shows the average rate of increase of the U.S. white
population in successive quinquennia from 1870 to 1955. The familiar
downward drift through the1930's and the recent increase are
immediately apparent. Less familiar, but equally obtrusive, are sig-
nificant fluctuations in the rate of change. The duration of the
fluctuations has run from ten to thirty-five years and their average
magnitude has amounted to about one-quarter of the mean rate of
change over the period as a whole. In Chapter 2, the components of
population growth responsible for these fluctuations were identified
(Figure 2). It was noted that, while immigration was typically the
principal factor in the past, the recent population upsurge has been
due to fertility.
Since 1870, then (and indeed even before [103, p. 36; 107]), the
FIGURE 22
AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF TOTAL WHITE POPULATION, 1870—1959
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historical record has consistently been marked by major swings in
the rate of population growth. But since the source of the recent
upsurge in the rate of population growth has been a rise in the
birth rate rather than in immigration, one might maintain that this
recent increase bears only a surface resemblance to prior swings and
that, given the new immigration restrictions of the 1920's, recovery
in the rate of growth was hardly to be expected. Whether this view
is correct or whether the recent movement does bear a logical relation
to its forebears is a question to which I return toward the end of the
chapter.
The Birth Rate of the Total White Population
Let us turn to the component of population change that constitutes
the center of our interest, the birth rate. Recent work has made
it possible to reconstruct a full century of fertility experience for
the white population of the United States.2 The annual birth rate
estimates have been averaged here for successive quinquennia, in
keeping with our interest in discerning Kuznets cycles.
The upper panel of Figure 23 brings out clearly the long-term
decline in the level of the birth rate and its recent recovery. It also
shows that the movement of the birth rate—even when smoothed
by a five-year average—has been far from regular. For the period
through the secular trough of the 1930's, intervals of rapid decline
alternated with intervals of slower decline or even absolute increase.
These are the long swings in fertility which Kuznets found in a
somewhat different set of figures. They are apparent throughout the
entire eighty-year period of fertility decline covered here.
2 Economists are perhaps not generally aware of the scarcity of historical data
on population change. When Kuznets made his study in 1958 [103], there were
no annual data on the crude birth rate before 1909.Thenew series, extending our
perspective to the years before the Civil War, is the product of a doctoral disserta-
lion by Melvin Zelnik, carried on at the Office of Population Research, Princeton
University, under the supervision of Ansley Coale [2201. The estimates were de-
rived by applying appropriate mortality rates to the decennial census single-year-
of-age distributions adjusted for "age heaping" (excessive reporting of certain
ages, primarily those ending in 0 and 5). As the upper panel of Figure 23 shows,
the patterns traced by these and the official estimates in the overlap period are
virtually the same; for earlier dates, however, the Zelnik figures are somewhat less
reliable because of the lesser accuracy or availability of data needed for the esti-
mates. The dissertation has now been published [321, but my analysis above uses
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The lower panel of Figure 23 presents the quinquennial per-
centage rate of change of the birth rate, computed directly from
the data plotted in the upper The average rate of decline
per quinquennium through the secular trough in 1935—39 was about
6 per cent. If this rate had prevailed uniformly throughout the entire
period, the individual observations would have formed the horizontal
line shown in the figure. The movement in the actual observations
about the line makes clear that the variations in the rate of change
were of substantial magnitude; in fact, the average value of the
deviations from the mean amounts to six-tenths of the mean rate of
decline itself. The duration of the two swings through the first decade
of this century was fifteen to twenty years, whether measured peak
to peak or trough to trough. The movements since then have been
of much longer duration, on the order of thirty-five to forty years.
But of what interest, it may be asked, is this exercise in quanti-
tative history for analysis of the baby boom? In reply, one might
suggest that it leads to revising one's conception of the historical rec-
ord, which has significant implications for interpreting recent experi-
ence. Typically, the historical movement which has been emphasized is
the long-term secular To this I would now add the observa-
tion that this decline has been far from regular; that, in fact, it has
been repeatedly characterized by fluctuations of noticeable amplitude
and substantial duration. The customary interpretation of the past
leads naturally to the view that recent experience constitutes an
abrupt break—a reversal in primary trend. In contrast, the conception
of historical change employed here suggests that recent experience
might be conceived as the latest in a succession of major movements
around the trend—a Kuznets cycle which, for some reason, is of much
greater amplitude and duration than its predecessors. Clearly this
view implies less of a break with historical experience and at least
raises the possibility of more easily reconciling the present with the
To avoid confusion, it should be noted that (1) it is the birth rate itself and
not the rate of change therein that is the component of the rate of total population
change shown in Figure 22, and (2) swings in annual birth or fertility rates do
not necessarily imply swings in the completed fertility of successive population
cohorts (see the concluding section of Chapter 5).
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past—a sine qua non of any attempted explanation of the baby boom.
Moreover, it suggests a new research strategy with regard to the
baby boom, namely, that one focus on explaining Kuznets cycles, past
and present, in an effort to determine whether the underlying causes
of these movements may have operated with exceptional force in
recent decades. It is in terms of this conception that the subsequent
analysis is organized.
Before proceeding to this analysis, there is one more feature of
Figure 23 that deserves attention. This is the precipitous decline in
the birth rate during the 1920's. A trend line fitted to the pre-1920
data in the upper panel and extended through the next two decades
would lie not only above the observations for the 1930's, but above
that for 1925—29 as well. From the lower panel, one finds that the
rate of decline between the first and second halves of the 1920's was
the second highest in the one hundred-year record, falling only
slightly below that in the next overlapping decade. This drastic decline
during a period of high prosperity has been cited by demographers
as grounds for discounting efforts to explain the baby boom on the
basis of economic factors. For example: "...theinterpretation of
the baby boom as the natural consequence of prolonged prosperity
is hardly more tenable than the earlier interpretation of the reversal
in the 1930's as momentary. The next earlier period of notable prosper-
ity in the United States—the 1920's—was a period of sharply falling
fertility. In fact, as Dudley Kirk points out, the depressed 1930's
produced more births by far than one would expect on the basis of
an extrapolation of the trend of the prosperous 1920's."
Ansley J. Coale, Introduction [170, pp. 5—6]. The reference is to Dudley Kirk,
"The Influence of Business Cycles on Marriage and Birth Rates" [170, pp. 241—
260]. The method followed by Kirk in his analysis is to correlate "trend deviations
of economic measures (as independent variables) to measures of nuptiality and
natality (as dependent variables)" [170, p. 242], using fertility data for the total
population for the period 1920—58. While the results are relevant to analysis of
fertility variations within the ordinary business cycle, in my view they cannot be
used to draw inferences about the baby boom. The "trend" lines fitted for the
period 1920—58 largely reproduce the Kuznets cycle which constitutes the baby
boom. By concentrating on explaining deviations from "trend," Kirk in effect
eliminates from his analysis the baby boom itself. Moreover, even with regard to
business cycle analysis, it would be of interest to distinguish components of the
total population whose fertility was subject to substantially different influences, as
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TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WHITE FEMALES,
20-44, BY NATIVITY, AND OF NATIVE WHITE FEMALES, 20-44,
BY RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE, 1890-1950
1890 1910 1930 1950
Total white 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Foreign-born white 20.9 19.9 14.7 4.6
Native white 79.1 80.1 85.3 95.4
Urban 30.2 39.6 51.5 64.7
Rural 48.8 40.5 33.8 30.7
SOURCE: Tabk C-5 and census reports.
aBasedon 1950 census definition of "urban."
Clearly, an attempt to reconcile present with past experience must
devote special attention to the record for the 1920's.
The Fertility of the Native andForeign-BornWhite Populations
The fertility of the total white population is a composite of that
of a number of subgroups, each subject in part to distinctive, in part
to common, influences. We can gain further perspective on the baby
boom if we consider separately the experience of the native and
foreign-born white populations, and, within the former, the urban
and rural components. Table 1 indicates the proportion of total white
females of reproductive age accounted for by each of these groups at
various dates. In the present section, we consider fertility patterns
for the foreign-born and total native white populations.
For the dependent variable, instead of the crude birth rate I now
use the fertility ratio, the number of children under 5 years old to
the number of women 20 to 44 years old, a choice necessitated by
the available As the following figures suggest, the fertility ratio
typically exceeds the crude birth rate by a factor in the neighborhood
of twenty to twenty-five:
Total White Population 1885—89 1905—9 1925—29
Crude birth rate (annual average) 35.3 29.4 22.4
Fertility ratio(next census date) 744 632 505
° Agood discussion of the conceptual and statistical problems relating to the
fertility ratio is given in [82, p. 13 and Appendix A].
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Analytically, this reflects the fact that the fertility ratio is computed
from (a) a denominator about one-fifth as large as that for the
crude birth rate (females aged 20—44 instead of the total popula-
tion), and (b) a numerator four to five times as large. (Implicitly,
birth experience over a five-year period is totaled rather than averaged,
and is multiplied by a survival rate on the order of .85 to .95 to ex-
clude those dying before the end of the period.) Thus the time pat-
terns traced by the two measures may differ somewhat because of
variations in the ratio of women aged 20—44 to the total population
and in the mortality of children under 5 years, particularly in infant
mortality.7
Figure 24 presents fertility ratios for the total white population
by nativity from 1875—79 to 1925—29, and, supplemented by general
fertility rates, for the native and total white populations to 1954—
58.8 The observations on fertility ratios are at census and mid-census
dates, but since they reflect fertility behavior over the preceding five
years, we have dated them according to the quinquennia to which they
refer. The lower panel shows the percentage rate of change per
quinquennium in each series, computed in the same fashion as for the
preceding figure.
Several points deserve mention. First, Kuznets cycles are evident
in the series for both the native- and foreign-born groups. Through
1925—29, the timing of the swings appears to be usually the same,
but the amplitude is substantially greater for the foreign-born white.
There is some suggestion of increasing amplitude, particularly for the
native white, and in the most recent period the magnitude of the
swing for this group is strikingly greater than previous ones. Arithmetic
LEVEL AND RATE OF CHANG












1 Forthe total white population, the only one for which comparison is possible,
the directions of change in the rate of change of the crude birth rate and of the
fertility ratio are identical from 1885—89 on, the principal period of the analysis,
with one exception. This exception is primarily due to an understatement of the
fertility ratio for 1910—14, because no adjustment was made for the exceptional
effect of the influenza epidemic of 1918.
8 The fertility ratio estimates, prepared in connection with the present study,
are based in large part on a valuable unpublished memorandum prepared by
Everett S. Lee providing age and parentage detail underlying the quinquennial
estimates of native white population published by Kuznets [103]. Because of
omissions or defects in the recent reporting of parentage and nativity, it was not
possible to continue these estimates beyond 1925—29. However, to provide some
idea of the pattern after 1925—29, use has been made of the official estimates of
the closely comparable general fertility rate (live births per 1,000 females aged
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analysis of the swings in the total white group shows that they are
caused in important measure by the fertility movements of both the
native and foreign-born components, and that the contribution of
shifts in the relative importance of the two groups has been negligible.
t
I86 / II: FERTILITY ANALYSES
The native-born white group, despite the smaller amplitude of its
swings, typically accounted for the dominant part of the movement
in the total because of its much greater share (Table C-12).
Some light is also cast on the precipitous rate of decline in total
white fertility in the 1920's. For both the foreign- and native-born
populations there is a substantial drop in the fertility ratio between the
first and second halves of the decade. However, the decline for the
foreign-born is more than double that for the native—29 against 12
per cent. Hence, a significant part of the decline in total white fertility
in the 1920's—to be precise, about one-third (Table C-12)—was owing
to the drastic reduction in the fertility of the foreign-born white pop-
ulation.° Indeed, for this group, if one adds the movement between the
two preceding quinquennia, the drop in fertility was nothing short of
spectacular. Between 1915—19 and 1925—29 the foreign-born white
fertility ratio dropped by about four-tenths, more than double the
decline during the preceding forty years.
The Fertility of the Urban and Rural Native White Populations
Our data now become even more limited, relating only to the
latter half of each decade from 1885—89 on. Estimates published by the
National Resources Committee [204] for 1905—9 through 1925—29 have
been carried back two additional decades. A constant 5 per cent ad-
justment by the NRC for underenumeration of children under five
years has been accepted here, in part because no basis for a differen-
tial rural-urban adjustment was readily available, and in part because
the analysis rests primarily on the figures for the more reliable censuses
from 1900 on. Our immediate interest is in the pattern through 1925—
29, and estimates for the native white population by rural-urban resi-
dence are only available to this point. To fill out the picture since then,
however, we have added overlap figures for the total white population
for 1925—29 on, an approximation which seems reasonable in view of
the much diminished importance of the foreign-born in recent years.
As is clear from the curve for the total native white group in
Figure 25, compared with that in Figure 24, the timing of the Kuznets
cycles before 1925—29 is such that omission of the observations for
"The decrease in fertility of foreign-born white women was perhaps the out-
standing feature of the decline in the birth rate during the twenties" [205,p.127].
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the first half of each decade tends to conceal the long swings. Never-
theless, some significant points stand out. As the upper panel shows,
the decline from 1885—89 to 1925—29 in fertility of the total native
white population was significantly greater than that for either of the
components. This was caused by the depressing influence on total
native white fertility of the continuous redistribution of population
from high-fertility rural to low-fertility urban areas. Quantitatively
this rural-urban shift accounted for about one-half of the total decline
over the forty-year period (Table C-iS). The depressing effect on
fertility was about the same in each successive decade.
A second point of interest is the greater decline in rural than
urban fertility through 1925—29. The rural decline is about half again
as great as the urban—18 as opposed to 12 per cent. Indeed, if one
considers the estimates for urban fertility from only 1895-99 to 1925—
29, there islittle evidence at all of a declining trend. The over-all
reduction in these three decades is only 4 per cent, and the impression
created by the curve is one of general stability.
This observation of substantial stability for a group accounting in
this period for a third to a half of white females of reproductive age
runs so counter to the common impression of a general and persistent
secular decline that it deserves further consideration. This is particu-
larly true since this group has tended to assume an increasingly
dominant role in determining the pattern for the total white population
and thus is of central significance for consideration 0f recent and
prospective experience of the white population as a whole.'° Could
the finding be a statistical artifact resulting from deficiencies in our
estimating procedure? The possibility cannot be discounted—I have
attempted to make a reasonable estimate for 1895—99, but with more
time and larger resources it undoubtedly could be improved. However,
even if we take only the more firmly based NRC estimates for 1905—9
through 1925-29—at the expense unfortunately of reducing our span
of observation to two decades—there is still little evidence of a signifi-
cant decline. In presenting these data the NRC does not call into
10Readersmay be reminded in this connection of the finding in Dorothy S.
Thomas' pioneering study of Sweden [1621 that during the nineteenth century
short-term fluctuations in fertility of the total population were initially dominated
by fluctuations in agriculture, but subsequently by those in industry.
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question the figures for urban native white population, though they
are accorded hardly any attention [205, p. 1271. With regard to
regional fertility patterns of the total white population, however, the
NRC does note that "these data show clearly a tendency toward the
leveling off of birth rates in areas long influenced by the lower birth
rate pattern" [205, p. 128].
Some additional historical evidence consistent with the finding of
stability is perhaps worth citing. In 1930, Joseph J. Spengler published
a study of the fertility of native- and foreign-born women in New
England, in which he concluded that "during the period between 1860
and 1915 no definite trend appeared in the native fertility rates" [149,
p. 84]. For the period from 1915 through 1925 (the last year of the
study), he found an upward tendency in fertility. Here, then, is an
area in the forefront of the process of urbanization and industrializa-
tion in which native white fertility did not significantly decline over a
long period stretching well back into the nineteenth century.11 The
appearance of a similar pattern for the nation as a whole at a later
date would clearly be consistent with thisearlier New England
experience.
One final point should be noted regarding Figure 25. The decline
of total native white fertility in the 1920's is now seen to be owing
more to a decrease in rural than urban fertility. Between 1915—19 and
• 1925—29, the reduction in rural fertility was close to 10 per cent, while
that for urban fertility was under 6 per cent. Thus further understand-
• ing of this period calls particularly for an explanation of the rural
decline.
Summary
While the fertility of the total white population declined substan-
tially from the latter part of the nineteenth century to the mid-1930's,
there was significant variation in the rate of change over time and
among component population groups. Even after averaging data so
as to eliminate or substantially reduce variability due to the business
cycle, marked fluctuations—Kuznets cycles of fifteen or more years
"A reexamination by Robert Gutman [83] of the reliability of the Massachu-
setts birth registration data used by Spengler, while arriving at a somewhat differ.
ent evaluation from Spengler, does not upset this finding.
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duration—stand out in the patterns for the total, native, and foreign-
born white populations. Moreover, in the first three decades of this cen-
tury the over-all decline in total white fertility was owing almost ex-
clusively to declines for the foreign-born white and rural native white
populations and to the shift from rural to urban areas; the fertility
of the urban native white population, the group of central importance
in understanding recent and prospective movements in the aggregate,
remained virtually unchanged. Considerations such as these raise the
question whether the baby boom, rather than an abrupt reversal in
a long-term downtrend, might not be at least in part a Kuznets cycle
of much larger magnitude than heretofore. To answer this,itis
necessary to look into possible reasons for these movements.
REASONS FOR KUZNETS CYCLES IN FERTILITY
OF DIFFERENT POPULATION GROUPS
Briefly stated, the analytical viewpoint underlying the subsequent
discussion is this: variations in the fertility of a given population group
are caused primarily by changes in two classes of factors—economic
condition and demographic composition. The "group" for which these
factors should be studied comprises those in the family-building ages.
Broadly, this embraces those aged 15—44 years, but for some purposes
particular attention should be paid to the younger members, those
aged, say 20—29, where so many decisions regarding marriage and
childbearing are concentrated. "Economic condition" refers to the
employment and income experience of the group. Ideally, "income"
here would embrace all sources, including even interpersonal transfers
from other age groups, though in the following discussion attention
is concentrated on the chief source, labor income. "Demographic
composition" refers to the distribution of the group, according to
characteristics such as age, sex, nationality, and parentage. A change
in demographic composition may itself stem basically from economic
forces, for example, a change in age composition of the foreign-born
due to a rise in immigration, but it is nevertheless useful to distinguish
the different channels through which these forces operate. Both
economic condition and demographic composition may affect the
over-all fertility of a population group by influencing either marriage
behavior, marital fertility, or both. No consistent effort is made here
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to distinguish the role of these two components in over-all fertility
change, though it would be of interest in a fuller treatment.12
The analysis below for the foreign-born takes up only composi-
tional factors, while those for the two native-born groups concentrate
on economic condition. It would have been of interest to examine,
where possible, the influence of economic factors on foreign-born
fertility in so far as they exert effects other than through compositional
change, and of changes in demographic composition on native-born
fertility, especially those associated with rural-urban migration.18 In
this discussion, however, I have not attempted an exhaustive analysis,
but have singled out those factors which seemed on the basis of my
initial investigation to throw significant light on the Kuznets cycles
shown by each group.
Foreign-Born White Fertility
As populations go, the foreign-born is an unusual one—primarily
because the source of its growth is immigration rather than
One result of this is a very atypical age, distribution. Unlike the usual
age distribution of a growing population, where the numbers tend to
fall progressively with each older age group, that of the foreign born
shows a concentration in the middle age groups with relatively small
numbers at the extremes, at least as long as immigration remains high
[164, p. 144]. Moreover, not only are the additions to this population
fed in at relatively advanced ages—the "prime" working ages—but
there is a significant disproportion between the sexes, with males
—
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12 This brief statement of analytical viewpoint is intended merely to highlight
the determinants studied here. Among other possibly important factors are varia-
tions in the competitive situation of children in the consumers' scale of preference
associated, e.g., with the introduction of new consumer durables, or a change in
the net income which children add to the family (see Joseph S. Davis [45, pp.
56—58] and Gary S. Becker [170, pp. 209—2.31]);changesin the availability of
credit resources; and shifts in techniques and knowledge of birth control. For
other contributions by economists, see [2, 7, 84, 112, 132, 134, 214 and 145a]. See
also my recent paper cited in Chapter 5, footnote 5.
13 A cursory look at the available data on compositional aspects of the native
white rural and urban populations suggests that they exhibit much less decade-to-
decade variability than the foreign-born white. See the 1890—1930 figures in
Thompson and Whelpton [164, Tables 41 and 56, and Appendix Tables 17, 23,
and 27]. While there are some excellent recent general studies on U.S. population
[19, 153], it is unfortunate that there is nothing that continues this remarkable
study to the present in its full analytical depth.
14 Children born to foreign-born women after immigration are, of course, classi-
fied as native-born.92 / II: FERTILITY ANALYSES
noticeably predominating. Finally, given wide swings in immigration,
such as have occurred in this country, the relative size even of
adjoining age-sex groups can fluctuate widely in as short a period as
a decade.
These considerations explain my starting with demographic com-
position in seeking clues to the variations in the rate of change of
foreign-born fertility. My immediate point of departure in studying
these movements, particularly the very steep decline in the 1920's was
the observation that the proportion of young foreign-born women who
were married dropped sharply from 192() to 1930, as is shown by the
following figures:
Age at Percentage Married
Specified Date
Why, one may ask, should such an abrupt decline occur? The chance
that a foreign-born white woman aged 20—24 by 1920 was married was
almost two in three, but if she reached this age group only one decade
later, the likelihood had declined to less than one in two.
An obvious hypothesis, stemming from the observation that the
proportion of young foreign-born men married remained almost
constant over the decade, is that the demand for women to marry
dropped off because of a decline in the relative number of males in
the market [101, 166]. In testing this, however, one must recognize
that the relevant ratio is not that of males to females in a given age
group, the standard sex ratio, since, as is well known, men typically
marry at a later age than women. For example, in the period 1890—
1930, at least 45 per cent of foreign-born white women were married
by the time they were 20—24, but for foreign-born white men this
proportion was not attained until ages 25—29 had been reached [164,
p. 395]. In attempting to explain the marriage proportion for foreign-
born white women aged 20—29, therefore, the ratio of foreign-born
white males aged 25—34 to females aged 20—29 was
15Theanalysis implies of course that native-born men did not constitute a
particularly important source of demand for foreign-born women. This assumption
seems consistent with the facts; in 1920 the proportion of foreign-born mothers
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FIGURE 26
RATIO OF MALES AGED 25—34 TO FEMALES AGED
20—29, AND PERCENTAGE OF LATTER MARRIED: FOR-








1890 1900 1910 1920 1930
SouRcE: Table C-7.
The relevant series are plotted in Figure 26 for the decennial
census dates 1890—1930. The close similarity between the patterns
traced by the two curves—a similarity which would not appear if
the standard sex ratio for those aged 20—29 were used—is impressive.
Apparently, the marital experience of young foreign-born white females
did depend very considerably on the gyrations of our rather un-
orthodox sex ratio, which in turn arose from the impact of both earlier
and current immigration on the age-sex structure of the foreign-born
population.18
In Figure 27, this line of reasoning is pushed a step further.
Here, at five-year intervals, the series for foreign-born white fertility
16Aninteresting by-product of the sharp decline in the marriage-relevant sex
ratio during the 1920's, and the corresponding reduction in the proportion of
foreign-born white females aged 20—24 who were married, was an abrupt rise in
the labor-force participation of this group from 37.6 to 50.1 per cent [118, Table
A-41.94 / II: FERTILITY ANALYSES
FICTJRE 27
LEVEL AND RATE OF CHANCE OF FERTILITY RATIO; AND OF RATIO OF MALES
AGED 25—34 TO FEMALES 20—29, AND OF FEMALES AGED 20—34TOFEMALES
20—44:FOREIGN-BORNWHITE POPULATION, 1875—1930
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and our marriage-relevant sex ratio (the two solid lines) are compared,
the latter being used in the absence of direct observations on the
marriage proportion at mid-census dates. As the lower panel shows,
while the movements in the rates of change of the two series are
not perfectly consistent, there is a noticeable similarity. Both series
show two trough-to-trough swings with the dates of peaks and troughs
close,if not identical. This suggests that at least one element re-
sponsible for Kuznets cycles in the rate of change of foreign-born
fertility was the changing proportion of males aged 25—34tofemales
aged 20—29 and the consequent effect of this on the marriage propor-
tion.
The broken line in the figure brings out a second demographic
feature of the foreign-born population that may have contributed to
the fertility swings, namely, the proportion of women aged 20-44in
prime reproductive ages, conceived here as encompassing ages 20—34.
Here too there is a suggestion of two trough-to-trough swings with
reasonably consistent timing, though the amplitude of the movements
is somewhat smaller for this series. However, in the beginning of the
period (for which the estimates are probably less reliable), the timing
relationships are somewhat off.
This brief discussion of Kuznets cycles in the rate of change of
foreign-born white fertility is designed to be exploratory rather than
definitive, and enough has perhaps been said to provide some support
for the view that shifts in demographic composition of the foreign
born associated with the changing impact of immigration were at least
in part responsible for these movements. Even if one accepts this
suggestion, however, there remain some troublesome discrepancies.
One—of particular interest in this analysis—is that in the latter part
of the period considered here, the decline in the rate of change of
fertility was somewhat greater than one would have expected on the
basis of the two factors so far discussed. One possible explanation,
suggested in several sources and consistent with the emphasis here on
compositional changes in the population, is an abrupt decline in the
proportion of foreign-born women in the prime reproductive ages who
came from the high-fertility countries of southern and eastern Europe.
There is substantial evidence that female immigrants from this area
typically had significantly higher fertility than contemporaneous im-
AND OF RATIO OF MALES
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migrants from northern and western Europe [82, p. 108; 189, pp. 4,
10; 2111. Clearly, a sudden drop in the share of young foreign-born
women from this source would tend to depress fertility.
Direct evidence to test this proposition is not available since
during the period concerned the census did not regularly publish age
detail for the foreign born by country of origin. However, it seems
possible to form a rough impression of the validity of the argument.
In the period 1890—1915, about two-thirds of all female immigrants
came from southern and eastern Europe; in 1915—30, about one-third.
I have attempted to estimate, therefore, for foreign-born women aged
20—84 at each of several dates, the proportion who had immigrated
between 1890 and 1915, the peak period of the "new immigration." 17
The results are as follows: 190045, 1910 =82,1920 =86,1930 =
48.The figures clearly suggest a drastic decline during the 1920's in
the share of young foreign-born women accounted for by the new
immigration,'8 and thus appear consistent with the suggestion that
the decline in the rate of change of foreign-born fertility during this
decade, attributable in part to the demographic shifts previously noted,
was aggravated by this factor.
Rural White Fertility
The explanation investigated here for Kuznets cycles in rural
fertility is a simple one; namely, that the rate of change of rural fertility
varies directly with that in the economic condition of the farm popula-
tion in family-building ages, approximated here by real farm income
per head of the farm population (or labor force) as a whole. If the
rate of growth of real farm income per head drops off, the rate of
change of farm fertifity would be expected to decline (algebraically).
The converse is true if the rate of farm income growth increases.
17 The technique for 1930, for example, was to compare the number of survivors
from the group of foreign-born women aged 5—19 in 1915, estimated by appro-
priate survival rates from [111, p. 23], with the number aged 20—34 enumerated
in 1930.
18 Thompson and Wheipton draw an opposite conclusion, namely, that the share
accounted for by the new immigration rose slightly during the decade and thus
could not have contributed to the fertility decline [184, pp. 271—272]. The pro-
cedure they use to infer the share of the new immigration, however, rests primarily
on figures for foreign-born women of all ages, and fails to take account of the fact
that the major shift in national origins of immigration in the 1920's particularly
affected the younger foreign-born age groups, those central to the explanation of
fertility.
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The analysis comprises two parts, one for 1885—89 through
1925—29 based on observations at decennial intervals; and one, em-
ploying averages at quinquennial intervals, for 1920—24 through 1954—
58. In the first part of the analysis, I use fertility data for the total
rural white rather than native rural white population, since the earlier
estimates for the former are probably somewhat more reliable for the
present purpose and the bias introduced by the inclusion of the rela-
tively unimportant foreign-born group in the rural total is probably
fairly small. This series is compared with five-year averages of real
gross farm income per person engaged in farming. The dates chosen
for the latter allow for a lead of one to one and a half years over the
fertility series. In the second part of the analysis, annual estimates of
the birth rate for the total farm population (white plus nonwhite),
converted to five-year averages for the first and second half of each
decade, are compared with real net farm income per head of farm
population, again with allowance for a lead of the latter over the
former.19 Both the quinquennial and decennial farm income series are
deflated by an index chosen to approximate the cost of living to farm-
ers. The series are plotted in the upper panel of Figure 28, and the
percentage change, our particular interest, in the lower.
By and large, as the lower panel shows, the data seem reasonably
consistent with the hypothesis—at least as consistent as one might hope
given the shortcomings of the data and the inevitable limitations of
any monocausal explanation. Swings in the rate of growth of real farm
income per head or per worker appear to be matched fairly closely
by swings in the rate of growth of rural fertility. Reference to the ad-
joining scales will show that the magnitude of the income swings is
substantially greater than that of fertility. This might be interpreted
as suggesting an elasticity noticeably under one, a result which seems
consistent with the findings of similar business cycle analyses.20
If this reasoning is accepted, then the historical course of rural
fertility change in this century would be conceived as reflecting in
19 The shift to the farm birth rate series is due in part to statistical convenience,
but more fundamentally to the fact that the connection between "rural" fertility
and farm income becomes progressively more tenuous as the rural nonfarm
population grows.
20 Cf. the studies of Gary S. Becker [170, pp. 209—231], Dorothy S. Thomas
[73, 161], Dudley Kirk [169, pp. 84-85; 170, pp. 241—257], and Morris Silver
[145a, pp. 237—2551.
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FIGURE 28
LEVEL AND RATE OF CHANGE OF RURAL WHITE FERTILITY RATIO (ErR.) AND
REAL GROSS FARM INCOME PER ENGAGED 1885—1929; AND OF FARM
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significant measure the pattern of major surge and relapse which has
characterized farm income growth. The accelerated rate of decline of
farm fertility in the 1920's and early 1930's would be attributed to
the drastic setback to the growth of farm income in the period fol-
lowing World War I, a decline so great that the absolute level it-
self was substantially reduced. The subsequent baby boom in rural
areas would be explained by the corresponding resurgence in farm
income growth in the late 1930's and 1940's associated particularly
with the war and postwar booms. And finally, the decline in the rate
of growth of fertility in the 1950's, which in terms of absolute level
meant a leveling off, would be explained by the tapering off of the
farm boom and substantial drop in farm-income growth. The data
suggest that the adverse effect on fertility in this most recent period
has been somewhat less than might have been expected. A number of
possible reasons for this come to mind, such as compositional changes,
the increased significance of nonfarm sources in the total income of
farm families [152, pp. 48—49], and the progressive rise in the propor-
tion of the "farm" population (1950 census definition) not engaged in
agriculture [198]; but it is not possible to pursue these questions here.
From what has been said, it should be clear that the fertility trend
for the total white population has been subject to substantial variation
as a result of major fluctuations in the fertility of the foreign-born and
rural white components. The fluctuations for these groups in turn
appear to have been caused by the impact of the rise and fall of immi-
gration on the age, sex, and nationality composition of the foreign-
born, and of major swings in agricultural conditions on the economic
condition of the farm population. It would seem to follow that gen-
eralizations based on the fertility record of the total white population
(or of the entire population, whose behavior is of course dominated by
the total white) would be extremely hazardous.
Consider, for example, the experience of the 1920's. If the fore-
going analysis is correct, the striking decline in total white fertility that
occurred in this decade was caused largely by the conjuncture of two
exceptional circumstances—namely, major shifts in the demographic
composition of the foreign-born population arising from the effect on
immigration of World War I and the subsequent imposition of re-
strictions, and, second, a major slump in agricultural conditions. When
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added to the continuous depressing influence of the rural-urban shift,
these circumstances created a decline in white fertility noticeably
out of line with previous experience. Knowing this, one is inclined
to view with some reserve statements such as that quoted previously,
which cites the sharp fertility decline for the total population in the
prosperous 1920's as a reason for discounting the effect of economic
conditions on fertility.
It is nevertheless true that even urban native white fertility de-
clined in this decade, though the decline of under 6 per cent for this
group is rather less impressive than the almost 20 per cent decline for
the white population as a whole. It is time, therefore, to see what
might explain the fertility pattern for this group.
Urban Native White Fertility
As in the rural analysis, the aim here is to explore the relation
between Kuznets cycles in fertility and in the economic condition of
the population of family-building ages. For the rural population, it
seemed reasonable to assume that the economic experience of those in
family-building ages could be inferred from the income experience of
the farm population as a whole. Such an assumption, however, does
not seem plausible for the urban group, with its much more varied
distribution of industrial and occupational attachments. In the absence
of direct information on the situation of those in family-building ages,
therefore, I have attempted to infer the state of the labor market for
young persons from two indicators, conceived as reflecting respectively
the demand and supply sides of the market. The first is the unem-
ployment rate for the labor force as a whole. A low rate is taken as
reflecting a generally favorable state of demand for labor, young and
old; a high rate, an unfavorable situation. The second is the rate of
change of the total white male population, aged 20—29, taken as a
crude index of the rate of entry of young persons into the labor market.
Other things equal, a decrease in the rate of entry would make for a
favorable labor market for young persons because of their scarcity;
an increase, an unfavorable market. Thus the hypothesis is that the
rate of change of urban native white fertility varies directly with that
of aggregate labor demand (read "inverted unemployment rate") and
inversely with that of th
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An example may clarify the reasoning. If the economy is experienc-
ing a Kuznets-cycle expansion, the rate of growth of labor demand
would increase and, other things remaining unchanged, one would ex-
pect this to lead, through its effect on income and employment condi-
tions, to a favorable response in fertility of the native population by
encouraging marriage and childbearing. However, under conditions
of free immigration, the increased rate of growth of labor demand
would also provoke an influx of immigrants. The resulting rise in the
rate of additions to the labor market would tend to counteract the
tendency toward tightening and thus offset in some measure the
stimulus to fertility of the native born. Note, in this connection, that
immigrants are typically concentrated in exactly those age groups in
which we are interested for the analysis of fertility. Conversely the
tendency toward an adverse impact on native-born fertility of a de-
creased rate of growth of labor demand during a Kuznets-cycle con-
traction would be moderated by a decrease in the rate of immigration.
Thus Kuznets cycles in the rate of change of labor demand would tend
to be compensated by swings in the rate of entry into the labor mar-
ket owing to immigration, and the consequent impact on native-born
fertility would be counteracted in some degree.22
Figure 29 presents the relevant series; as before, the upper panel
shows the levels of the variables, the lower, their rates of change. To
facilitate inferences from the graph, the curve for each of the explana-
21 Although the view that variations in the general unemployment rate primarily
reflect changes in aggregate demand seems most consistent with formal theory, it
is not essential to the analysis. Alternatively, one might think of movements in the
general unemployment rate as indicating the average course of employment con-
ditions,i.e., the net outcome of aggregate demand and supply, and changes
in the rate of entry as indicating. variations in the deviation from the average
of the situation for young persons. However, the fact that for most of the
period covered here a rise in the rate of entry accompanied a reduction in unem-
ployment seems consistent with the emphasis on aggregate demand (Table C-li,
cols. 2, 3).
22 Some may note a similarity between this reasoning and Francis Walker's
analysis emphasizing the adverse influence of immigration on the fertility of the
native population [212, 213]. Walker, however, was concerned with the primary
trend, whereas the present ana'ysis refers only to Kuznets cycles, and in addition
takes account of the stimulating influence to native fertility of the very conditions
which encourage a rise in immigration.FICUER 29
LEVEL AND RATE OF CHANGE OF URBAN NATIVE WHITE FERTILITY RATIO
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE (u), AND RATE
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WEITE FERTILITY RATIO
OR FORCE (u), Aiw tory variables has been plotted inverted so that an upward movement
ED 20—29 (s), 1885—1958 would be expected to cause an upward movement in the fertility curve,
other things remaining unchanged.
If we first consider variations in the decade rates of change
through 1935—39, the most interesting feature is the inverse movements
of the two explanatory series. As the lower panel shows, whenever the
rate of growth of aggregate labor demand (the lower solid line)
moves in a way favorable to fertility, the change in the rate of entry of
young persons into the labor market (the broken line) moves ad-
versely, and vice versa. In the early part of the period the swing in
o supply conditions reflects chiefly movements in immigration—exactly
the situation described in the example above. Later, the supply move-
10 mentreflects primarily variations arising from demographic sources.
For example, the increase in the decade from 1915—19 to 1925—29 corn-
pared with that in the decade preceding reflects an exceptional rise in
20 . . therate of mcrease of native white males aged 20—29, which traces in
turn to a corresponding movement in the total white birth rate earlier
in the century.
So far as directions of movement of the explanatory series during
this period are concerned, therefore, they carry no clear implication
regarding the expected behavior of the rate of change of fertility—a
plus in one is accompanied by a minus in the other. And, indeed, the
fertility curve fails to exhibit the fluctuations of either of the two ex-
planatory series. Rather, one finds simply one extended swing from the
beginning through the period 1925—29 to 1935—39. The 1920's, with a
relatively small decline in the rate of change of fertility, form a con-
sistent part of this picture, a favorable movement in demand condi-
tions being offset by an adverse one in supply. Interestingly, if one
were to smooth out fluctuations in the two explanatory curves by, say,
a simple two-item moving average, both, and particularly the unem-
ployment rate, would show an extended swing rather similar to that of
the fertility curve. An average of the two explanatory curves would
produce the same effect.
Still more intriguing is the behavior of the three series after 1935—
39. In this period, the rate of change of labor demand continues its
pattern of rise and fall, with a swing of noticeably greater amplitude
on. than previously. In striking contrast to the preceding pattern, however,
- -104 / II: FERTILITY ANALYSES
the change in the rate of entry into the labor market levels off instead
of fluctuating inversely. And, for the first time, the rate of change of
fertility exhibits a Kuznets-cycle movement, reproducing with re-
markable similarity the fluctuation in the rate of change of labor de-
mand. The inference suggested by these movements seems clear. With
immigration restricted and without a surge in the rate of labor mar-
ket entry from the native-born population caused by demographic
processes, the favorable impact of a swing in the rate of growth of
demand—itself much larger than heretofore—was felt with much
greater force by the young native whites in the labor market. As a
result, the rate of change of fertility of this group reproduced the
swing in labor demand in significant measure for the first time.
If one considers magnitudes of the variables rather than simply
rates of change, the argument seems reasonably well borne out, though
the correlation is not perfect. In Table 2, each of the seven observa-
tions on the rate of change in fertility is classified according to the
accompanying values of the rate of change in the unemployment rate
and in the percentage change in white males aged 20—29. One finds
that, holding the change in rate of entry into the labor market con-
stant (that is, examining each row in the table separately), the rate
of change of fertility varies directly with the rate of change in demand
(inversely with the rate of change in the unemployment rate). Con-
versely, holding demand conditions constant (examining each column
TABLE 2. OBSERVATIONS ON PERCENTAGE BATE OF CHANGE
PER DECADE IN URBAN NATIVE WHITE FERTILITY, CLASSIFIED
BY CONCURRENT CHANGE PER DECADE IN PERCENTAGE OF
LABOR FORCE UNEMPLOYED AND IN PERCENTAGE RATE OF
CHANGE OF TOTAL WHITE MALES, AGED 20-29, 1885-1958
Change per Decade in Percentage
Change per Decade in Per-
centage Rate of Change of
Total White Males, Aged 20—29
Unemployed (percentage points)
—2 to
(percentage points) —16 —8 +2 +7 +14
+8 to +10 +2 —6
—2 to —5 +42 +18 —8 —22
—18 0
SOURCE: Table C-li.
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separately), there is a tendency for the rate of change of fertility to
vary inversely with the change in the rate of entryinto the labor
market, though in this case there is one inconsistency (the +18 and 0
entries being out of order vertically). Whether this discrepancy pri-
marily reflects a fundamental deficiency in the analytical scheme or an
inadequate approximation to the economic condition of those of family-
building age provided by the explanatory series used here, it is not
possible to say.
A comprehensive measure of the income and employment ex-
perience of young persons for the period covered here remains tantaliz-
ingly out of reach. Yet such additional evidence as I have been able
• to assemble supports the view that the income experience and labor
market situation of young persons were exceptionally favorable in
recent years. Consider the following:
23
1.In the 1940's, earnings in the lower-income occupations rose
much more rapidly than those in the higher, and then, in the 1950's,
at about the same or a slightly lower rate [180, No. 33, Jan. 15, 1960,
pp. 6—7,andNo. 85,Jan.5, 1961, p. 521. Since young people are more
highly concentrated in lower-income occupations than older people,
they must have particularly benefited from the movement of the 1940's.
The very fragmentary evidence available suggests no corresponding
development in the 1920's.
2. The shift of young persons into higher-earning ocãupations pro-
ceeded at a much greater rate in the 1940's than in the two preceding
decades. In 1940, 17 per cent of males aged 15—24 in nonfarm occupa-
tions were in the three highest income classes (professional, technical,
and kindred workers; managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm;
and craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers). By 1950, 41 per cent
of this same group of males (now aged 25—34) were in these classes,
an improvement of 24 percentage points. From 1920 to1930, the im-
provement for the cohort moving through the same ages was 17 points,
23Inthe examples cited, the typical movement from the 1930's through the
1950's is consistent with the pattern shown by the rate of change of fertility—that
is, the abrupt break with past experience, in a direction reflecting a particularly
favorable situation for young persons, occurs between the 1930's and the 1940's.
The movement from the 1940's to the 1950's suggests a slowing or even reversal
of the process. It is likely that between the first and second halves of the 1950's
this pattern would be still more apparent (cf Chapter 5).106 /II:FERTILITY ANALYSES
andfrom1930 to 1940 it was 12 points. Corresponding figures for the
cohorts aging 25—34 to 35—44 in the three successive decades are 7, 4,
and 14 points. Other things being equal, this more rapid shift to
higher-income occupations points to a significantly higher rate of in-
come growth for young persons in the 1940's than in the two preceding
8. Expansion of government transfer payments provided a new
bulwark to income in the 1940's and 1950's, especially in the form of
veterans benefits and unemployment compensation for younger persons.
4. Labor force participation rates in the 1940's showed a marked
break with previous trends in a manner strongly suggesting a shortage
of young workers. The sharp downtrend in participation of white males
aged 14—19 which had prevailed since 1900 was completely reversed.
A similar movement appears even to have characterized those aged
10—13 [111, pp. 364—367]. The long-term rise in labor force participa-
tion of older women was greatly accelerated because jobs that would
ordinarily have been filled by young persons were left open. And
while, for young women as a whole, labor force participation declined
slightly as a larger proportion married and had children, the rates for
wives, even those with preschool-age children, rose substantially.
Finally, while it is not possible to cite figures on the long-term trend,
part-time employment rose substantially after 1940, and it seems likely
that this too stemmed at least in part from a shortage of young work-
ers. In the 1950's the rise in labor force participation of older women
continued virtually unabated, but the rate for those aged 14—19 re-
sumed its long-term decline.25
5. Since 1940, home ownership among young persons has risen to
levels markedly higher than had previously prevailed. The following
figures for nonfarm household heads show, for each age group, the
percentage of dwelling units which were owner-occupied at each
date: 26
24 The figures for 1930—50 are computed from [94, Appendix Table 1]; for 1920,
from unpublished estimates comparable to [94] kindly provided by W. Lee Han-
sen. Data for armed forces as reported in the census were included with the
1940 and 1950 figures.
25 The evidence cited in this paragraph is from the excellent census monograph
by Gertrude Bancroft [12, pp. 29—31, 58, 77—82, and Ch. 4). See also Part III
below.
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Age 1890 1900 1930 1940 1949 1959
14 10 11 12 21 16
24 21 28 22 85 42
35 34 44 37 58 63
There is a marked advance in the situation of young persons after
1940, part of which must be due not only to a great increase in credit
availability but to a substantially improved income position as well
which encouraged taking on long-term commitments.
6. Finally, there are the characteristics of the baby boom itself. A
recent study [82] has shown that a major factor in the boom has been
the significant decline since 1940 in age at marriage. From 1890 to
1940, age at marriage drifted irregularly downward, the decline in the
median for all females amounting to oniy one-half year. In the next
decade, a period one-fifth as long, the reduction was twice as great
[186, Series A-229]. In addition, wives have had children much sooner
after marriage. These two factors, earlier marriage and earlier child-
bearing, rather than mothers having substantially more children,
accounted for most of the rise in the fertility rate through 1954 [82, pp.
365_371].27 The central role of young families in the baby boom is
obvious. It would be difficult indeed to account for this unless their
income and employment experience had been exceptionally good.
CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS
The most striking feature of the baby boom—and thus the one calling
most urgently for explanation—is the apparent abrupt break with his-
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s; for 1949 and 1959, from
[91, p. 1107, Suppl. Table 1]. (Data for those aged 18—24 from the latter source
were adjusted to 15—24 on ±e assumption that no heads of households under 18
own their own homes.) The 1930 and 1940 estimates are for male heads of house-
hold only, which biases them slightly upward compared to the figures for the
other dates.
27Thedraft law policy of deferring fathers doubtless encouraged earlier mar-
riage and childbearing, but without an income situation that favored expansion of
the family beyond the first child, it is doubtful that it could have produced a
baby boom of the type experienced. There is now reliable evidence that the
average number of children per mother has also risen in the postwar period. This
development is of course consistent with the analysis presented here. The longer
the exceptional labor market situation prevails, the more likely the fertility re-
sponse will take this form in addition to earlier marriage and earlier childbearing.108 / II: FERTILITY ANALYSES
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easier when one recognizes that even before the 1940's the historical
record was characterized by fluctuations of significant magnitude and
duration, and that the record for the total white population is a com-
posite of the varying experience of several component groups, subject
in part to quite different influences. Major swings in agricultural con-
ditions, on the one hand, and Kuznets cycles in nonagricultural activity
with accompanying immigration fluctuations, on the other—each with
their peculiar historical timing—gave rise to distinctive fertility re-
sponses on the part of the rural white, foreign-born white, and urban
native white populations. When one unravels these differing strands
of experience and considers their underlying influences, the impression
emerges that the recent fertility behavior of the urban native white
population, the group of central significance for explanation of the
baby boom, is not as inconsistent with its earlier character as was
heretofore believed. In the first three decades of the century, the
fertility of this group, instead of exhibiting a declining trend, showed
reasonable stability. And in the recent period the effect on the labor
market of a Kuznets-cycle expansion—an expansion stronger, according
to our data, than any preceding ones considered here—was for the
first time not accompanied by an offsetting rise in the rate of labor-
market entry due to a significant increase in either immigration or the
native-born population in young working ages. The unprecedented
concurrence of these three circumstances—a Kuznets-cycle expansion
in the economy, restricted immigration, and a low rate of labor force
entry from the native population resulting from demographic processes
—created an exceptional job market for those in family-building ages
and as a result drastically accelerated the founding of families.28 This
28 With regard to the causes of the exceptional labor market for young persons
in the 1940's and 1950's, the present chapter emphasizes quantitative scarcity to
the exclusion of relative quality. The following figures on median school years
completed by young and middle-aged males at various dates may partially right
the balance (see also Figure 19):
Age at 1970
Specified Date 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960(projected)
(1) 25—29 8.4 8.7 10.1 12.0 12.3 12.5
(2) 45—54 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.7 10.0 12.0
(3) (1)—(2) 0.3 0.5 1.7 3.3 2.3 0.5
Note the immense gain in the educational advantage of young over middle-aged
workers in the 1940's, a change which sharply improved their competitive position
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process was further abetted by a concurrent boom in agricultural con-
ditions, which evoked a similar fertility response on the part of the
rural white population.
In conclusion, some of the implications of the preceding analysis
for the past and future may be set forth.
With regard to the past, it was noted earlier in the discussion that
while Kuznets cycles in the rate of population growth are not a new
phenomenon in our history, the shift in the source of these movements
from immigration to fertility raises a question whether the recent cycle
bears any logical connection to its predecessors. The implication of the
present analysis is that indeed such a connection does exist. As long
as we permitted free immigration, the rise and fall of immigration in
response to swings in labor demand associated with Kuznets cycles in
this country acted as a buffer to moderate the impact on the urban
native white population. With the restriction of immigration, however,
the urban native white population felt the impact of a Kuznets-cycle
swing in labor demand with unprecedented force, and the result was
an unparalleled response in fertility and thus again in the rate of
population growth.
The implications of the present analysis for the longer-term future
of fertility change are in contrast with that likely to be suggested by
the typical demographic discussion of our fertility history. The cus-
tomary emphasis of demographers on the long-term secular decline in
the past would suggest a view of the current fertility decline as a
resumption of the primary trend.29 The interpretation suggested by
the present analysis, however, would be that for the group whose
at just the time that labor demand was booming. The timing is fortuitous, stem-
ming from the abrupt advance in the diffusion of high-school education that
occurred in the 1920's and especially the 1930's. (The figures are from [178, pp.
236, 238] and [182, pp. 6—7]. The 1920 and 1930 values were assumed the same
as those reported by the corresponding cohorts in 1940, the first time that data
on educational attainment were collected.)
The sequence of change in the educational differentials calls to mind the recent
pronounced convergence in income distribution by size. One wonders to what
extent the change in the size distribution in the past forty years may reflect chang-
ing income differentials by age associated with variations in both the relative num-
ber and quality of young workers.
29 Clearly the present analysis suggests that a reexamination of the primary
trend itself in terms of the differing patterns of the groups distinguished here
might prove fruitful.
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experience is of central significance for the future, the urban native
white population, the nature of the primary trend in this century—
whether upward or downward—is not readily apparent, and the recent
behavior of this group may be largely explained as a Kuznets-cycle
phenomenon. If this is correct, then substantial fertility variation, up CHAPTER 5 /TF
or down, may Qçcur again over the longer run.
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